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(limited) number of valuable theoretical works studying the process of collective reputation 
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I. Concepts of Reputation: Individual versus Collective 
Over the last four decades, since Akerlof (1970) demonstrated that the 
presence of imperfect (asymmetric) information can lead to market failure, 
the literature has extensively investigated the determinants and the 
consequences of reputation, the latter being defined as the beliefs about 
seller’s skills and behaviour (Bar Isaac and Tadelis, 2008).1 Indeed it has 
been shown that even a small amount of imperfect information is sufficient to 
give rise to (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) and to maintain (Fudenberg and 
Levine, 1992) a reputation effect. 
The extent of this intuition is so large that since then it has been 
applied to every field of economic profession (and also to other disciplines 
such as: artificial intelligence, biology, computer science, political science, 
psychology, scientometrics and sociology2). Reputation has first emerged as a 
valuable asset (also tradable, Tadelis, 1999) in monetary economics, where 
central banks (Rogoff, 1985), policymakers (Barro and Gordon, 1983), 
investment banks (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994), and even borrowers 
(Diamond, 1991) need to establish a certain degree of reputation. The 
relevance of the concept of reputation has been then extended to economic 
agents in every economic field (see Kreps, 1990 and Weigelt and Camerer, 
1988 for general discussion), with a spectrum of applications that ranges 
from R&D3 to traditional manufacturing sectors and professional services4 
(even to Medieval trade5).  
In particular, given the experience nature of the good and the presence 
of significant information asymmetries, it has been noted that the wine 
market is an ideal field in order to investigate reputation phenomena since 
“common examples [of asymmetric information contexts] include mundane 
transactions in which a person buys a bottle of wine with unknown quality” 
(Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008, p. 2756). 
Since economic agents hardly work in isolation, reputation is rarely an 
individual matter. In fact, they tend to operate within institutions such as 
                                                 
1 “Such information and beliefs about the seller’s skill and behavior, which we refer to as the 
seller’s “reputation,” are a consequence of many things. These include direct observations on 
past performance, experience with other sellers, reports from third parties, actions that the 
seller may undertake outside of the transaction, and numerous other factors”, p. 277. In a 
similar vein, Cabral (2005, p. 4) defines reputation as the situation “when agents believe a 
particular agent to be something”. Thus, the concepts of quality and reputation are connected 
but not necessarily coincident, the former being affected by the latter and by a number of 
other factors such as marketing campaigns, word-of-mouth phenomena, etc. 
2 See Mui, Halberstadt and Mohtashemi (2002). 
3 See Seybert (2010). 
4 See Fombrun (1996).  
5 In this sense see Grief (1989).  
6 For an application to the wine industry see Castriota and Delmastro (2011).    3 
business companies, or companies themselves can co-operate under a 
collective brand label. A shared brand name can reduce information 
asymmetries especially when the scale of production is too small and 
individual agents fail to establish a reputation on a stand-alone basis. 
Therefore, more recently economists have developed the concept of collective 
reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations (Tirole, 19967). This 
again applies widespread in economics (and once more in other social 
sciences), from the above mentioned contexts in which works the concept of 
individual reputation, up to the very general notion of markets and 
institutions (Grief, 2006).  
The agri-food sector figures prominently for possible applications of 
collective reputation models. Geographical names have been used since 
ancient times to identify high quality products like Greek olives, Parma ham, 
Danube salmon, Russian caviar and, more recently, Washington apples. In 
particular, a marketplace where historically geographical appellations have 
played a crucial role is viticulture, with wines from Barolo, Bordeaux, 
Burgundy, Champagne, Chianti, Montalcino, Napa Valley and Rioja being 
the most famous examples.  
In this (and other) sector(s), having a good collective reputation implies 
significant advantages. First, collective (or group) reputation is important 
because agri-food markets (but think also of financial markets or professional 
services) are dominated by a huge variety of products/services and abundance 
of information. Consumers willing to economize on the costs of ascertaining 
quality often rely on the reputation of groups of firms for their purchases 
(Andersson, 2002). In particular, when forming expectations consumers have 
to choose what sources of information to use and the extent of deepening to 
achieve (Costanigro et al., 2010).  
The first source of information is usually related to geographical group 
brands (i.e., appellations and denominations), information on firm and/or 
product characteristics requiring a higher level of expertise (Fleckinger, 
2007). Second, the use of a well-known group brand may enable (small) 
producers, that dominate most agri-food markets, to reap the benefits of a 
reputation rent, without incurring all the costs that a company has to face 
when it has to establish the reputation of a commercial brand name.8 Finally, 
some people attach value to the regional traditions and are willing to pay a 
premium for it (Vogel, 1995) while others associate quality with the respect of 
a set of rules on safety, integrity, or conformity to industrial processes, which 
requires the creation of agreed norms among a coalition of local producers. 
                                                 
7 Before Tirole (1996), economists mostly referred to conventions (see for instance Kandori 
1992, and Kreps, 1990 who relates conventions to corporate culture).  
8 As to the European wine sector, Bureau and Valceschini (2003, p. 3) claim that “the 
appellation of origin has proved successful in allowing even small producer groups to benefit 
from a well-established reputation”.   4 
Despite the ubiquity of the concept, the economic literature on 
collective reputation is still in its infancy. So far, some research has 
concentrated on modeling the process of collective reputation building (Tirole, 
1996; for a dynamic stochastic extension see Levin, 2009), with implications 
on product quality, market equilibrium, firms’ performance and welfare 
effects (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005, Evans and Guinnane, 2007, 
Fleckinger, 2007).  
Empirically, while there are a few papers trying to evaluate the impact 
of collective (and individual) reputation on firm performance9, there is no 
work that has so far tested the determinants of the process of collective 
reputation building.  
Thus, this work intends to open the black box. In particular, after an 
analysis of the theoretical mechanisms of the collective reputation building 
process (in Section II), we set up an empirical exercise intended to test 
comprehensively the determinants of this process. So, in Section III, we 
provide detailed explanations of our empirical setting, defining an 
appropriate measure of group reputation and shedding light on the product 
and geographic market under consideration, the groups of economic agents 
under investigation and all the explanatory variables taken into 
consideration. Notice that we operate on a universe of coalitions (i.e., all 
Italian wine denominations) of firms  (i.e., wineries) and not on a sample.  
Section IV provides first econometric evidence through a static 
exercise. We analyze correlations between the collective reputation and a 
comprehensive set of possible determinants, i.e., the size and age of the 
coalition, the geographic context in which it operates, the rules set up in 
order to discipline and monitor each member’s action.  
However, since reputation building processes may be history 
dependent (Tirole, 1996), we go further in Section V with a dynamic exercise 
which covers 30 years. We are thus able to provide unique econometric 
evidence by using panel data analysis over a very long period of time.  
Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Building a Collective Reputation 
From the theoretical viewpoint collective reputation is usually modeled 
as an aggregate of all the agents in the coalition (see Tirole, 1996 and Landon 
and Smith, 1998) or of its most famous members (Gergaud and Livat, 2004).  
                                                 
9 Due to the large availability of data from prestigious wine guides, some empirical papers 
dealing with (the consequences of) collective reputation refer to the agri-food sector (wine in 
particular). For studies analyzing (among other things also) the impact of collective 
reputation on wineries reputation or on wine prices see Landon and Smith (1998), Schamel 
and Anderson (2003), Costanigro et al. (2010) and Castriota and Delmastro (2011).   5 
In his seminal paper, Tirole (1996) made one of the first attempts of modeling 
group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations, studying the joint 
dynamics of individual and collective reputations and deriving conditions to 
build group reputations. In his work, new members joining a group “inherit” 
the good or bad reputation of the coalition, so that collective reputation turns 
out to be history dependent. Also in Gergaud and Livat (2004) individual and 
collective reputations influence each other, this latter work studying the joint 
dynamics. 
Having said about the dynamics of collective reputation, it is fair to 
acknowledge that economists are very far from having developed a 
comprehensive analysis of the determinants of collective reputation building 
process. The aim of this section is thus to summarize theoretical 
achievements drawing up reputation literature, while in the next sections we 
investigate thoroughly the determinants of the reputational evolution of 
coalitions of economic agents.  
When trying to investigate the elements which drive the success of 
coalitions in terms of prestige, it is clear that some of the variables affecting 
individual reputation should be important determinants of collective 
reputation as well given that some mechanisms of reputation building are 
expected to work in the same way at the individual and coalition levels.  
First, like for companies10, the age of the coalition and of its brand is 
important since it takes time for the brand to get known among consumers 
and for entrepreneurs and employees to learn by doing. This is particularly 
true for experience goods (such as wine), where consumer/expert learning is 
crucial for reputation. Furthermore, stereotypes about the expected quality of 
a group are history dependent since collective reputation is a long term, path 
dependent process (Tirole, 1996).  
Second, size can be another driver, given that large coalitions of 
companies (but also large companies themselves) have higher resources for 
marketing campaigns and a larger buyer base which, combined with word-of-
mouth phenomena, make big coalitions more visible to the market (see Rob 
and Fishman, 2005  for a theoretical approach to individual firms). On the 
other hand, Kandori (1992), analysing the information transmission 
mechanisms through which self-interested community members sustain a 
rule in a context where agents care only about their own interests, shows the 
opposite pattern: the higher the number of community members, the less the 
effective social norms. Informal sanctions can improve the behavior in 
infrequent trades: a simple action rule and local information transmission 
are shown to be sufficient to induce a mutually beneficial outcome.  
In a similar vein, Fishman et al. (2008) argue that in absence of perfect 
monitoring the members of a community have an incentive to invest on the 
                                                 
10 See Melnik and Alm (2002) for an empirical application to firms.   6 
group reputation, but also an incentive to free ride which can lead to lower 
investments in quality, especially when the brand size increases: “if too many 
firms are admitted to the brand, the incentive to free ride necessarily 
overrides the reputation effect and reduces the incentive to invest, relative to 
stand-alone firms. This is because once the brand is sufficiently large, the 
marginal contribution of an individual member’s investment to the brand’s 
visibility and reputation becomes negligible, in comparison to the payoff from 
free riding” (p. 4).11  
The second group of determinants is represented by the rules set and 
the actions put forward by the members of a coalition in order to reach and 
maintain a certain collective reputation standard. In this sense, the setting of 
minimum quality standards (MQS) is a classic example of this kind of norms 
(but see also Grief, 2006, for an historical application of this concept). Indeed, 
many professions are subject to occupational licensing and quality regulation, 
whose standards are sometimes set by the public authorities but more often 
(at least partially) by the professional groups themselves.  
Some economists believe that entry regulation is meant to increase the 
producers’ incomes at the expense of consumers, while others consider it as a 
solution to the asymmetric information problem between producers and 
consumers. In this latter view, introducing minimum standard requirements 
can increase clients’ trust and lead to a Pareto-improvement, if the risk to 
meet an incompetent or fraudulent producer diminishes.12 Rouviere and 
Souberyan (2008) show that free entry is not socially optimal due to the 
producers’ incentive to free ride on the collective reputation and, again, find 
that the introduction of minimum quality standards to correct this market 
failure is necessary to avoid good companies staying out of the market, which 
in turn justifies entry regulation. Indeed, under certain assumptions, 
Fleckinger (2007) shows that in an asymmetric information context entry 
regulation and minimum quality standards can be socially efficient.  
However, imposing some minimum quality standards is useless if the 
members of the coalition do not respect the rules, which recalls the 
importance of the concepts of social capital and enforcement. In order to keep 
reputation, it is necessary a strong discipline which is maximized when it is 
                                                 
11 Jin and Leslie (2009) provide empirical evidence of the existence of free riding problems 
when finding that franchised restaurants have lower hygiene standards with respect to chain 
affiliated ones, thereby taking advantage from (but also damaging) the chain quality. 
12 A number of studies identify a positive effect of their introduction on quality (Leland, 
1979), quality and price competition (Ronnen, 1991) and social welfare (Crampes and 
Hollander, 1995, Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997, Garella and Petrakis, 2008, and Saitone and 
Sexton, 2008). In their study on collective reputation McQuade, Salant  and Winfree (2008) 
find that in non-monopolistic markets the introduction of MQS would be welfare improving. 
On the contrary, a negative impact has been found by Shapiro (1983) on products supply, 
Bockstael (1984) on social welfare and producer returns, Maxwell (1998) on profitability of 
innovations, Scarpa (1998) on quality and profits, and Valletti (2000) on social welfare.   7 
sustained by the treat of exclusion from the group (Tirole, 1996), which in 
turn requires traceability (Winfree and McClucskey, 2005)13 and frequent 
and effective controls14.  
This and previous remarks on the role played by conventions create 
room for the last group of determinants: the context where a coalition 
operates. Many studies on the determinants of growth have shown that local 
GDP, the quality of infrastructures and of institutions, and social capital 
influence a country’s growth rate (see, among others, Abrams and Lewis, 
1995) which is given by the performance of individual firms. In addition, in 
collective reputational studies the level of trust in a coalition of agents 
(strongly affected by the level of corruption and criminality in the region) is 
the result of decades or centuries of historic events which have shaped the 
mentality of a population, the level of enforcement of social norms, and thus 
might have a great impact on the quality of goods and consequently on 
collective reputation (see again Kandori, 1992, and Kreps, 1990). Finally, in 
some sectors the so called “primitives” (like the climate and the quality of 
land in agriculture) are fundamental in determining the quality of the final 
products, hence, other things being equal, of their group reputation. 
 
III. Study Design 
In this Section we proceed to discuss the empirical analysis we set up 
in order to investigate properly collective reputation building process and its 
determinants.  
A.  Field of Analysis: The Wine Market 
Four factors have been individuated in order to determine the 
importance of reputation for economic transactions: (i) the rate at which 
buyers learn from outcomes, including the rate of information diffusion 
among buyers; (ii) the seller’s value of future interactions; (iii) the 
characteristics of the demand that determine how sensitive buyers are to 
reputation; (iv) the extent of uncertainty about the seller and/or her products 
(Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008). 
                                                 
13 The authors show that, when collective reputation does not have firm traceability, firms 
will extract too much from the stock of reputation, selling low-quality products at high prices 
justified by the high past levels of quality.  
14 Principal-agent theories suggest that, if transaction costs are low, tighter monitoring will 
increase agent’s work effort. However, when the relation between principal and agent is not 
only economic but also personal, then the effect of closer monitoring might be more than 
counterbalanced by the feeling of distrust which ends up reducing total effort (Frey, 1993). 
Furthermore, in a recent contribution Moav and Neeman (2010) find that the relationship 
between the precision of information about an agent’s performance and his incentives to 
exert high effort is not monotonic.   8 
In this respect the wine market represents an ideal testbed in order to 
investigate phenomena related to reputation (see also supra). First of all, 
wine is an experience good, meaning that buyers learn only after purchase 
about the real characteristics of the product, which makes reputation an 
important variable affecting purchases.15 Second, entrepreneurs often have 
intrinsic psychological motivations, so that they have a long time horizon and 
a high discount factor (Scott Morton and Podolny, 2002). Third, consumers 
are very sensitive to reputation, especially when they refer to the high 
quality spectrum of the market, i.e., premium, super-premium, ultra-
premium, and icon wines (Heijbroek, 2003). Finally, since the wine market is 
dominated by uncertainty and asymmetric information, the so-called “wine 
denominations” were born as collective responses to market failures 
connected to wine frauds and, more generally, to radical consumer 
uncertainty on the quality of producers and their products (Unwin, 1991).  
Having discussed the elements that make the wine market a natural 
field to investigate the determinants of collective reputation, several 
characteristics make the Italian market a perfect candidate for analysis. In 
fact, Italy is the leading country in the world for both grapes and wine 
production, and wine export (before France, Spain and the USA). It is also 
the third consumption market after France and the USA and before 
Germany, China and the UK.16 In addition, the Italian market is 
characterized by great variability of wineries quality and high uncertainty for 
consumers.17 Finally, due to historical reasons and to the high population 
density, the property of land is dispersed among many small producers. It 
turns out that in Italy only a minority of wineries are able to build a strong 
reputation on a stand-alone basis, while for most of them the reputation of 
one (or more) wine denomination is fundamental.18  
                                                 
15 Fleckinger (2007) points out that expert ratings “even preempt public consumption: it is 
the very role of premieres and journalists of specialized press to provide the public with an 
evaluation before purchase take place. Again, the case of wine where experts are the first to 
taste and give an overall appreciation for a given region for the current year is illustrative”. 
See next paragraph for a discussion about the role of experts in the wine market. 
16 World Vitivinicultural Statistics (2009), Organisation Internationale de la Vigne et du Vin 
(OIV). Note that reported figures are in absolute values so that in pro-capita terms Italian 
position is even better.  
17 “If consumers are fazed when presented by the challenge of a very long list of names to 
memorize, there may be some consolation in the fact that never before [in Italy] have so 
many fantastic choices been available” (Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book 2004, p. 106).  
18 Immediately after World War II the Italian Government had to face the dramatic problem 
of small unemployed/underpaid farm workers. Thus, in 1950 the Parliament issued a law 
(Nr. 841/50) to expropriate the land of big landowners (latifundia) and redistribute it to the 
farm workers. As a result, the average size of farms is nowadays much smaller than what it 
was before 1950.   9 
B.  Coalition of Economic Agents: Wine Denominations  
As said, wine denominations (and other geographic food labels) are the 
joint response of wineries (farmers) located within a specific geographic area 
to market failures. They establish rules for producing and selling a wine 
under the same umbrella brand name (see for instance Winfree and 
McCluskey, 2005). In this sense, wine denominations are a perfect example of 
coalitions of economic agents who share a common reputation.19  
In Italy, coalitions of wineries are formed at two levels. At the first 
higher level, wineries are organized within firms producing one appellation of 
quality wines (i.e., DOCG and DOC).20 Appellations are regulated by national 
decrees (i.e., disclipinari) that rule technical and economic aspects of wine 
production (see infra). However, appellations include a very broad spectrum 
of products and producers.  
So, at a second lower level, wineries producing homogeneous wines are 
arranged into more specific coalitions called wine denominations.21 This is 
because national legislative decrees that institute appellations divide them 
into a number of denominations (from 1 up to 52 for each appellation) that 
substantially differ one from another in terms of a relevant number of 
characteristics. First, the specific characteristics of the wine produced 
(grapes, color, type). Second, the technical rules set up in order to establish 
minimum quality standards. Third, the number of producers that joined the 
denomination. Thus, even within the same appellation, reputation varies 
considerably among denominations.   
For instance, Asti Spumante and Moscato d’Asti are the two 
denominations that belong to the same appellation (DOGC Asti). They differ 
in terms of group size (in 2006, the number of producers was 4,784 for Asti 
                                                 
19 Note that denominations satisfy building blocks of theoretical models: i) individual past 
behavior of each single winery is imperfectly observed by consumers; ii) the past behavior of 
members of a denomination influences the group’s current behavior; iii) the behavior of new 
wineries of a denomination depends on the past behavior of their elders; iv) a denomination’s 
reputation is as good as that of its members (see Tirole 1996).  
20 In the EU there exists a classification of wines based on two broad categories, quality 
wines (i.e., VQPRD, Vins de Qualité Produits dans les Regions Determinées) and table wines, 
where quality wines are mainly identified with the origin of grapes. Italian wines are 
classified into four categories (from the lowest to the highest level of quality): vini da tavola 
(table wines), indicazione geografica tipica (IGT – typical geographic indication), 
denominazione di origine controllata (DOC – controlled denomination of origin) and 
denominazione di origine controllata e garantita (DOCG – controlled and guaranteed 
denomination of origin). In the year 2008, there existed 358 appellations (36 DOCGs and 317 
DOCs).  
21 “Nowadays (at 31/12/1997) in Italy there are 18 DOCGs and 279 DOCs. Both types of 
appellations consist of almost 1.200 collective wine brands of different typologies of wine, 
specifically provided for by the relative national decree.” (Italian Sommelier Association, 
General Notions of National Oenology, p.132). Indeed, in 1998 there were 1,237 wine 
denominations, number that has increased up to 1,424 in 2008 (see Table A.1).   10 
Spumante and 519 for Moscato d’Asti), wine type (the former is a dry or 
sweet sparkling wine, while the latter is a sweet low alcoholic wine), 
minimum quality standards (the minimum wine alcoholic content is 5,5° for 
the former and 8,5° for the latter), and international reputation (Asti 
Spumante scores 1-2 stars in the Hugh Johnson’s wine guide, while Moscato 
d’Asti reaches 2-3 stars).  
From above considerations it derives that our analysis will concentrate 
at the denominations level. In fact, the umbrella brand name is defined at 
that level so as collective reputation and most of its possible determinants, 
from the type of wine to the minimum quality standards.  
In order to test empirically factors influencing group reputation we 
have collected data on the universe of wine denominations that have been so 
far (and since 1963) established in Italy.22  
C. Measures of Collective Reputation: Denomination’s Ratings 
In markets with incomplete and asymmetric information rating 
agencies have emerged as a natural market response. They have the scope of 
gathering information, signaling (i.e., providing new information to the 
market), and certification (i.e., evaluating the reputation of institutions, 
firms, and individuals; for a recent review of Credit Rating Agencies see 
Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet, 2009).  
In the wine market, complexity of products, large number of sellers 
and labels, and finiteness of buyers’ memory have stimulated the creation of 
mechanisms to centralize and disseminate information. In particular, wine 
guides (i.e., structured evaluations of experts and gurus) have assumed the 
function of rating agencies (Hay, 2010). Their role has become so important 
that they exert a significant effect on wine prices both in the short run and in 
the long run (Ali at al., 2008). More generally, guides play a decisive role for 
reputation of individuals (e.g., chefs, oenologists), firms (e.g., wineries, 
restaurants) and coalitions of agents (e.g., wine and other denominations, 
collective brand names) in all agri-food sector (see Gergaud, Smeets and 
Warzynski, 2010 for an analysis of French gastronomy23). 
If these conditions hold true for the wine market in general, the 
natural characteristics of the Italian market (e.g., large number of wine 
denominations, wineries and labels, and great variability of quality between 
                                                 
22 Since we analyze the universe of Italian wine denominations the present study does not 
suffer from sample selection bias which usually harms most reputational studies.  
23 “For most chefs, having his restaurant being awarded one or more stars in the famous 
Michelin Guide Rouge represents a major achievement, a recognition of their work, and also 
increased notoriety generating a significant stream of future revenues. In this specific 
industry, experts play a decisive role, and reputation of restaurants and chefs are basically 
established according to their opinion” (Gergaud, Smeets and Warzynski, 2010, p. 1).    11 
different products) make it ideal to study reputation in terms of score 
evaluations provided by wine guides.
 24 
So, in order to measure collective reputation we have employed the 
stars assigned by a wine guide25 (see Table 1 for a description of the 
explanatory and dependent variables of wine denominations). In particular, 
we measure group reputation by relying on scores assigned by the Hugh 
Johnson’s wine guide. We chose Hugh Johnson’s wine book, because it is the 
most diffused and acclaimed international guide, and it is the only one that 
rates continuously (Italian and other) wine denominations. Furthermore, 
Hugh Johnson’s wine guide is published yearly since 1978, so that we can 
observe wine ratings for 30 years.  
Hugh Johnson’s wine guide assigns, when present, from 1 to 4 stars to 
each denomination.26 Of course not all denominations reach an international 
standing: indeed only half – i.e., 723 out of 1,424 – of all Italian wine 
denominations are present in the guide. Thus, we assign 0 to wine 
denominations with no international reputation, and the relative number of 
stars to denominations present in the guide. 
D.  Other characteristics of a coalition: size, history, rules and system of 
(quality) controls 
We collect information on the general characteristics of the wine 
denominations, drawing upon national decrees and Italian Chambers of 
Commerce. In particular, we examined all national decrees,  issued from 1963 
to 2008, that have instituted (and eventually modified) denominations. The 
decrees regulate all the relevant aspects of denominations, including the year 
of establishment (age of the denomination), the type of denomination (i.e., 
DOCG or DOC, see footnote 20), compulsory minimum quality standards, 
additional quality standards and other product characteristics (e.g., color and 
type).  
As a preliminary remark, it is important to notice that national 
decrees are issued by the Italian Government after a specific application 
presented by a local coalition of producers. Of course, the role of the 
Government is not only to rubber and stamp the decree proposal; however, 
the enactment of the decree is the ending of a lengthy and complex process 
                                                 
24 “Wine lovers often complain that Italian wines are difficult to understand….You simply 
have to adopt one of three ploys. You could plump for a familiar producer’s name, like 
Antinori, or seek out a recognizable denomination like Barolo…There is a third way: seek 
help…there are guides” (Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book, 2009, p. 94). 
25 Another possible way would be to ask consumers their opinion about all wine 
denominations. However this is practically unfeasible since we should have asked consumers 
their opinion for more than one thousand different types of wine denominations. Moreover, 
this data would be static and not dynamic as in our case.  
26 Hugh Johnson assigns also half stars in the form of intervals, such as 1-2 stars, 2-3 stars, 
3-4 stars.   12 
which starts and represents the expression (voted by each member) of the 
coalition of producers of the wine denomination.  
In particular, for each denomination, the decree provides specific rules 
over the province(s) and sub-zones where the wine can be produced, the 
horizontal characteristics of the wine, and the quality standards to be 
achieved (in both the agronomical and oenological phases of wine production). 
As to these latter, criteria include: species to be planted and minimum 
percentages of vines which must be used; maximum number of plants and 
grapes per hectare (grapes yields); maximum ratio between wine obtained 
and grapes used (grapes/wine); minimum wine alcohol content, minimum 
wine total acidity, and wine ageing practices.  
Moreover, the decree may establish the introduction, within the same 
denomination, of further types of wine, where quality standards are set more 
severely on a voluntary basis (vertical differentiation) with respect to 
technical aspects such as the selection of vineyards (classico and sottozona), 
the agronomical procedures (passito, vin santo and late harvest), and the 
oenological standards (novello and riserva). As to the spectrum of horizontal 
differentiation of a wine denomination, controls include the color (white, rosé 
and red) and type (dry, slightly sweet, sweet, sparkling, and spumante).  
Dynamic data from all Italian Chambers of Commerce (110, one for 
each Italian province) have been also gathered in order to assess the number 
of producers that adhere (from 1993 onwards) to all Italian wine 
denominations.27  
In this respect, it is worth noting that inspections on the compliance of 
above mentioned norms and rules by members of a wine denomination are 
conducted at the Frauds General Inspection Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. So we have gathered data on the wine inspection activity of local 
offices28 of such body (data have been acquired since 2003). In particular, we 
define (two) measures of the level of effectiveness of the local system of 
quality controls: the percentage of local wine producers controlled every year 
by the local body (using ISTAT data for the universe of wineries in that 
region29), and the average amount of penalties (in €) given by the local body 
                                                 
27 The authors gratefully acknowledge the fundamental role played by Unione Italiana Vini 
in collecting such data. 
28 These are the local offices of the Frauds General Inspection Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture: Conegliano (with branches in S. Michele all’Adige, Verona and Udine) for Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Trentino Alto Adige; Milan (with branch in Brescia) for 
Lombardy; Turin (with branches in Asti and Genoa) for Piedmont, Liguria and Valle d’Aosta; 
Bologna (with branch in Modena) for Emilia Romagna; Florence (with branch in Pisa) for 
Tuscany; Rome (with branch in Pescara) for Lazio and Abruzzo; Ancona (with branch in 
Perugia) for Marche and Umbria; Naples (with branches in Salerno, Campobasso and 
Potenza) for Campania, Basilicata and Molise; Bari (with branch in Lecce) for Puglia; 
Cosenza for Calabria; Palermo (with branch in Catania) for Sicily; Cagliari for Sardinia.  
29 ISTAT (Italian Statistical Office), 5° Censimento Generale dell’Agricoltura (2000).   13 
per administrative notification. Variables are three-year averages (i.e., 
average values in the period 2005-2007) so that such measures of efficacy of 
quality controls are not influenced by yearly shocks. In this sense, we control 
both for the probability of being checked and the (economic) costs of cheating.  
We complete the information set by collecting data on average socio-
economic indicators for the province(s) of production of each wine 
denomination that capture the following context aspects: domestic demand 
structure (local GDP per capita), local entrepreneurial ability (index of 
entrepreneurship), geographical externalities (index of economic 
infrastructures), trust climate (crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) and the 
importance of natural endowment (value of vineyards).  
 
IV. Static  Analysis   
Even though reputation may be time dependent, we start with a static 
analysis. In fact, static analysis – in 2008, after 30 years of evaluations 
(recall that the first evaluation was in 1978) – may be regarded as a “steady-
state equilibrium” analysis in theoretical models; so that it conveys 
interesting information. More practically, data in 2008 are exhaustive while 
dynamic information is partially incomplete (see Section V): the static 
investigation allows us to estimate at one time the role exerted on collective 
reputation by all possible factors.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the year 2008. Collective 
reputation ranges from 0 to 3.5 stars, with average of 1.03 and standard 
deviation of 1.09. The average age of the denominations is 24 years, ranging 
from 42 for the oldest to 1 for the youngest. Minimum quality standards vary 
significantly according to the coalition’s willingness to increase the average 
product quality. Also the characteristics of the coalition (i.e., the number of 
producers) and the socio-economic indicators for the provinces of interest are 
subject to radical differences among the denominations.30  
Table 3 shows the number of wine denominations for each category of 
international reputation, in terms of stars awarded by Hugh Johnson’s wine 
guide in 2008.  
                                                 
30 Differences in economic conditions and social capital are usually substantial across 
countries but small between regions. Italy represents one of the few exceptions, given its 
huge differences in the level of GDP per capita, level of infrastructures, organized crime and 
social capital when moving from the North to the South. It is worth to remember that 
Banfield’s (1958) pioneering study on the effect of social trust on economic development was 
based on a small community in Southern Italy. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), using 
data on blood donations and electoral participation, find that the huge differences in social 
capital among Northern and Southern Italy contribute to explain the gap in financial 
development and, in turn, economic prosperity.    14 
It is important to notice that the vast majority of regressors used in 
our study are exogenous. Therefore, reverse causality issues are confined to 
few possible cases even in static regressions. Indeed, all independent 
variables are lagged of (at least) one year; i.e., reputation refers to 2008 
scores, while regressors are recorded one year before (except for the number 
of members of a denomination, see infra).  
Furthermore, variables such as the age of the denomination and socio-
economic controls are clearly exogenous. A similar line of reasoning holds 
true for minimum quality standards and variables capturing vertical and 
horizontal product differentiation, which can be hardly influenced by the 
reputation of the denomination.31  
The only three variables potentially affected by reverse causality are 
the type of denomination (i.e., DOCG versus DOC), the size of the coalition 
and the value of lands. The DOCG level is awarded to wines with outstanding 
superior characteristics which over time have gained prestige. However, legal 
procedure to obtain a DOCG is long, complex, uncertain and requires a lot off 
lobbying activity (see supra). As a result, DOCs are usually upgraded to 
DOCG with a considerable and unpredictable delay from the date of 
application.  
As to the size of a coalition, it might be the cause of group reputation 
since size is associated with visibility, but also its consequence if an 
increasing collective reputation attracts a growing number of firms willing to 
benefit from the accumulated asset. However, the inflow of new producers 
into a coalition is not free since (i) the grapes must grow in a limited area 
pointed in the legal decree and (ii) the coalition usually fixes a maximum 
number of producers for a three-year period, subject to eventual renewal. 
This reduces the risk of reverse causality. Next, in order to rule out this 
doubt we use two years lagged data for the number of producers (year 2006), 
while all the other independent variables, as said, refer to the year 2007. In 
addition, we first run econometric estimates without including the number of 
producers, and only then we include also this variable into the econometric 
models.32  
With respect to the value of land, which is clearly (at least partially) 
affected by the prestige of the wines which can be produced, there is nothing 
we can do, but it is not the main target of the research. However, it is worth 
noting that recently a number of studies have questioned the direct impact of 
                                                 
31 As mentioned the process of awarding a denomination (DOC or DOCG) and setting MQS is 
very lengthy and complex, and involves many agents and institutions at different levels so 
that reverse causality is unrealistic.   
32 Note that the introduction in the estimates of this variable causes also a reduction of the 
number of observations from 1,424 to 1,391. This is because some denominations have been 
created from 2006 onwards, and thus we do not have data on the number of producers.    15 
terroir on the quality of wine (see, for example, Gergaud and Ginsburgh, 
2008). 
A.  Econometric Estimates 
Given the discrete nature of the dependent variable the econometric 
methodology relies on ordered Logit regressions with robust standard errors. 
The sample used is the universe of all 1,424 denominations, whose reputation 
is regressed on the variables listed in Table 1. Therefore, the structure of the 
equations will be the following: 
 
i i i
i i i i
CONTEXT CHARACT PRODUCT
S CONTROL RULES CHARACT COALITION REPUTATION
  
   
  
    
5 4





where REPUTATION is the score assigned by the Hugh Johnson’s 
wine guide and the subscript i refers to the denomination. Table 4 shows five 
models (the fifth will be discussed in the next paragraph). In the first we 
control for the characteristics of the coalition (COALITION_CHARACT), the 
socio-economic variables at the province level (CONTEXT) and the horizontal 
differentiation controls (PRODUCT_CHARACT). Without including rules 
(RULES) - i.e., compulsory and voluntary quality standards - and controls 
(CONTROLS), the dummy variable for the DOCG category turns out to exert 
a strong positive effect. On average, DOCG denominations have higher 
minimum quality standards and consequently are more prestigious than 
DOC ones.  
In line with theoretical predictions age has a strong positive effect: 
everything else being equal, older denominations have built over time their 
reputation. Indeed, especially for experience goods, it takes time to build a 
good reputation.  
Socio-economic variables go in the expected direction with GDP per 
capita, number of enterprises per 100 inhabitants, index of level of 
infrastructures and average value of vineyards having a significant and 
positive effect on reputation. Note also that the social context impacts on the 
reputation of a coalition of producers, with areas characterized by a higher 
level of crimes suffering from lower levels of collective reputation (results of 
single variables are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request).  
Variables capturing horizontal differentiation are not expected to play 
any role, unless they reflect the personal taste of the evaluator or the quality 
of the national products relative to that of foreign ones. As expected, in our 
estimates coefficients are generally jointly significant (see the Wald test at 
the end of the table), but individually they are only weakly significant   16 
(results of single variables are again omitted for reasons of space and 
available upon request).33  
In the second regression we insert as an additional control the 
minimum quality standards required by the law to produce wines belonging 
to a certain denomination. All quality standards are strongly significant, 
except for wine alcoholic content. Note that stricter rules in terms yields, 
grapes/wine conversion ratio, wine acidity and ageing greatly improve the 
reputation of the coalition of producers. This finding provides a solid 
empirical ground to those theoretical works identifying a positive, rather 
than negative, link between minimum quality standards on one hand and 
quality and group reputation on the other.  
The size of the coefficient of the dummy variable DOCG decreases 
significantly but is still significant at 5% level. Minimum quality standards 
are aimed at increasing the average product quality and thereby capture a 
big part of the positive effect of the DOCG label.  
The third regression repeats the exercise by adding the voluntary 
quality standards aimed at providing additional vertical differentiation. 
Previous results hold, with only the size and significance of the DOCG 
dummy variable decreasing (even more). Strict requirements on both 
agronomical (i.e., sottozona) and oenological (late harvest, passito, vinsanto 
and riserva) activities display a positive and significant influence on the 
reputation of the coalition.  
Finally, in the fourth regression we control for the system of quality 
controls. As evident  from the estimates, having a more effective system of 
controls, in term both of monitoring and punishment, greatly impacts on the 
reputation of the coalition of agents, with both variables being individually 
and jointly statistically significant at 1% level.  
The bottom of the table reports joint tests for significance of 
coefficients (Chi-squared Wald tests) for the five groups of variables 
(characteristics of the coalition, rules, controls, geographical context and 
characteristics of the collective product, respectively). The null hypothesis 
that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected at 1% level for the 
first four groups. The coefficients of the variables measuring horizontal 
differentiation are weaker and even insignificant in some regression. 
                                                 
33 The only one which is statistically significant is Spumante, which has a negative 
coefficient. This is probably due to the implicit comparison with the French counterpart 
Champagne which can rely on a tradition of centuries tracing back to Napoleon. The great 
commander used to claim that after each battle there is need for a bottle of good Champagne, 
either to celebrate or to seek consolation. 
   17 
B.  Optimal Number of Members of a Coalition 
In the last column of Table 4 we focus on the role exerted by the size of 
the coalition, measured by the number of its members. In fact in Model 5 we 
extend Model 4 by using the number of producers as additional control; to 
check for a possible non-linear relationship, we also consider the square of 
the number of producers. The relation is indeed concave, with those 
coefficients being of opposite sign (i.e., positive the linear and negative the 
squared) and statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Figure 1 reports a graphical simulation of the relationship between the 
number of firms in a coalition and the reputation of the denomination itself 
(while other independent variables are set to zero).34 The reputation of the 
denomination benefits from the size of the coalition because of higher 
visibility and market power, and increases until a peak at around 3,300 
members. However, after this peak the effect of group size on collective 
reputation is negative due very probably to free-riding problems. This result 
sheds definitive lights on the relation between members of the coalition and 
group reputation and confirms recent theoretical predictions (Fishman et al., 
2008). 
It is also important to notice that this concave relation between 
coalition size and group reputation rules out the possibility of reverse 
causality which, in fact, would require a linear relationship between the two 
variables of interest. Indeed, if it were Y (reputation) influencing X (number 
of producers), by inverting the axes of the plot in Figure 1 we would not have 
anymore an univocal relationship between the two variables. In other words, 
if the causality direction went from collective reputation to number of 
producers, it would be difficult to justify that relation: starting from a top 
reputation, a decline in it can lead both to a decrease and an increase in the 
number of producers. While a decrease makes sense, an increase does not. On 
the contrary, it would be easy to understand a reverse causality problem if 
the two variables had a linear relationship which, however, is not the case 
here. 
Looking again at the two last regressions of Table 4, we can see that 
while the effect of age, rules (MQS, additional QS), and quality controls is 
strongly confirmed, that of DOCG vanishes. This is an interesting piece of 
news, meaning that, after controlling for all factors, the reputation of the 
denomination depends on all the other objective characteristics considered in 
the analysis, and not on an institutional signal. 35 
 
                                                 
34 The simulation has been performed by estimating Model 5 with robust OLS. 
35 A significant coefficient attached to the DOCG dummy variable would mean either that the 
evaluator got influenced by the institutional signal or that there are some unobserved 
components we cannot control for.   18 
V. Dynamic Analysis  
In the previous section we showed, within a static framework, that the 
reputation of a coalition depends on the rules and actions (and number) of its 
members. We also illustrated that institutional signals may play a less 
significant (even null) role, once we control for all relevant aspects, while the 
context is key in shaping the behavior of the members of the coalition and 
affecting the quality of their products, hence their reputation. In this section, 
we investigate dynamics of collective reputation.  
In order to do this we create a database with seven waves, starting 
from 1978 and acquiring information every five years: i.e., in 1978, 1983, 
1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008. The structure of the dataset is the same as 
in the previous chapter, with two exceptions: first, new denominations have 
been created over time, therefore old waves have a lower number of 
observations; second, the level of investigation declines when going back in 
time since for the first waves it is not possible to get information for all the 
considered variables.  
Looking at Table A.1 reported in the Appendix we can see that the 
number of denominations has grown from 686 to 1,424 over the last 30 years. 
However, while for the year 2008 we have information on all the variables 
listed in Table 1 and used in the static analysis, before 1993 we are not able 
to collect detailed data on compulsory minimum quality standards, the 
number of producers in the denomination  and the context variables at the 
province level. As to the latter, however, in the dynamic econometric analysis 
we can instead insert regional dummy variables without losing much 
information.36 Finally, data on the system of control dates back to 2003; 
hence they are not reported in the dynamic analysis.  
A.  Dynamics of Collective Reputation 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of reputation of Italian denominations in 
the last 30 years. The plot clearly shows the increasing reputation of national 
wine denominations, mainly due to the definition of stricter MQSs and 
additional QSs, linked to the introduction, in 1980, of the DOCG system of 
appellations37, and to the upgrading of oenological and agronomical 
standards of DOCs. This evolution provides further evidence on the 
                                                 
36 We follow consolidated geo-statistics analysis (i.e., ISTAT classification) by dividing Italy 
in five macro-regions: North-West (Piedmont, Aosta Valley and Liguria), North-East 
(Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige), Center (Tuscany, Emilia 
Romagna, Marche, Umbria and Lazio), South (Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata 
and Calabria), and Islands (Sardinia and Sicily). North-West is the omitted one to avoid the 
dummy variable trap. 
37 The first DOCGs to be awarded were Barolo, Barbaresco, Brunello di Montalcino and  Vino 
Nobile di Montepulciano in 1980. Then Chianti and Chianti Classico followed in 1984.   19 
determinants of collective reputation and will be analyzed later in this 
section.  
As to the dynamics of collective reputation Table 5 shades new lights. 
To study reputational dynamics we have computed transition probabilities 
(from time “t” to “t+5”) where each state is defined by the values of collective 
reputation. In other words, we report, in Table 5, the probabilities that a 
coalition characterized by an i-level of reputation (from 0 to 4 stars) at time 
“t” turns, after five years, to a j-level.  
First, in line with theoretical predictions (Levin, 2009, p. 10, see also 
Proposition 1 of Tirole, 1996), there is persistence in the data (79% of 
observations do not change reputation state over a five year period) with 
reputation being hence history dependent. In particular, bad collective 
behavior in the past increases the probability of being stuck within a bad 
reputation equilibrium; the probability of remaining in a bad reputation state 
being significantly higher that others (87.5%). In other words, data show the 
presence of a “bad reputation trap”. 
Nevertheless, a not negligible percentage of coalitions, more that 20%, 
change their reputation level from one period to the next. The probability of 
changing is higher for lower (but not the lowest) and higher levels of 
reputation, so that, second and contrary to theoretical predictions, other 
possible steady state equilibria are more likely for intermediate values of 
reputation.  
As a final remark on dynamics, transition probabilities show that, 
when it changes, collective reputation tends to adjust smoothly, with very 
rare big reputational jumps.  
B.  Determinants of Collective Reputation at “t=0” and t=30  
Given the persistence in reputational dynamics, it is fundamental to 
investigate determinants of collective reputation at time “t =0”, i.e., at the 
time of the first reputational evaluation (i.e., 1978).  
In this study we have this unique opportunity since we collected data 
on collective reputation and its determinants since 1978, the first year of 
publication of HJ’s guide, hence the first year in which Italian denominations 
were ever rated.38 In this sense, we regress determinants of collective 
reputation at a time when there were still no public knowledge on Italian 
wine denomination quality.  
                                                 
38 Note that in 1978 there were no other structured source of ratings of wine denominations 
and Italian denominations were still very young (the first DOC was established in 1963, 
while the first French classification system dated to 1855), so that 1978 HJ’s evaluations 
represented the very first reputational assessment.    20 
We can also compare this result with previous static analysis, after 30 
years of ratings (i.e., 2008), and look at eventual differences. However, in 
doing so, we have some data constraint. As mentioned above, in 1978 data on 
MQS are missing, so as geographical controls which are replaced with 
regional dummies. In addition, in 1978 DOCGs were not already established 
(see footnote 36) as well as the “novello” type of wine.  
Table 6 presents results of robust Logit regressions on determinants of 
collective reputation at time 0 and after 30 years. Note that in 1978 the 
universe of wine denominations included 686 coalitions of producers, while 
this number has reached 1,424 nowadays.39 Results of estimates strongly 
confirm previous considerations. First, the age of the coalition still remains 
the regressor which exhibits the strongest (positive) explanatory power. 
Second, quality rules set up by the members of the coalition of producers (i.e., 
QS) display a joint significant effect on collective reputation (se the Wald test 
reported at the end of the Table), with single coefficients of both agronomical 
(i.e., sottozona) and oenological (i.e., riserva) standards positive and strongly 
significant.  Similarly, geographical and horizontal differentiation controls 
display a relevant role, even bigger than in the 2008 estimation.  
C.  Panel Data Analysis 
In Table 7 we repeat the exercise of Table 4 by running Random 
Effects Ordered Probit regressions on the yearly level of collective reputation. 
In the first model the time span considered ranges from 1978 to 2008 (seven 
waves) while in the second from 1993 to 2008 (four waves). The regressions 
include different categories of variables depending on the availability of data 
(see again Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
The number of observations declines when reducing the number of 
waves and when adding the number of producers as a further control. 
Nevertheless, results obtained in Table 4 hold: age, compulsory and 
voluntary quality standards exert a positive effect on collective reputation. 
The same holds true for the number of producers whose non-linear effect 
persists.  
We also insert time dummies in order to control for time shift events. 
In particular we want to check the effects of episodes such as the introduction 
of the DOCG system in 1980 and the methanol scandal in 1986.40 Time 
                                                 
39 Given the reduced number of observations in 1978 relative to the large number of possible 
reputation state (i.e., 9), we proceed to estimate logit instead of ordered logit models, where 
the dependent variable takes the value 0 as before (i.e., when reputation is absent) and 1 if it 
is present, irrespective of the exact number of stars awarded by HJ. 
40 The scandal arose when a (limited) number of firms traded wine adulterated with 
methanol which, at that time, due to fiscal discounts was cheaper than sugar. While, when 
assumed in reasonable amounts, ethanol is not toxic for the human body, methanol is 
poisoning and can be responsible for severe damages to the nervous system, blindness or   21 
dummies show (for the first 25 years) a positive trend, due, as said, to the 
effort of Italian winemakers which, despite the 1986 scandal of the wine 
adulterated by use of methanol, has translated into better quality. 
Finally, we have tested determinants of reputation by using a dynamic 
panel data model (i.e., Arellano and Bover, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 
1998, estimator). Results are reported in the Appendix (see Table A.2). Of 
course, such model does not take into account the categorical ordered nature 
of our dependent variable, and explanatory variables are confined to those 
that are time variant. However, results provide further insights and 
confirmation of previous results. Indeed, reputational persistence is 
witnessed by the value of the lagged dependent variable. Minimum quality 
standards are again jointly significant with both agronomical (i.e., yields) and 
oenological (i.e., acidity) aspects being statistically relevant. Lastly, once 
again it is confirmed the concave effect of the number of members of the 
coalition of producers.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
While the literature on individual reputation is huge, that on collective 
reputation is still scarce and scattered. Existing theoretical works analyze 
mainly the dynamics of collective reputation, but not the determinants of it, 
while (the very few) empirical papers focus on the consequences of collective 
reputation, especially on the price the seller is able to charge.  
However, so far no (empirical) work has analyzed comprehensively the 
determinants of group reputation. We do so by studying the determinants of 
collective reputation in the Italian wine market, our database being 
composed by the universe of wine denominations in the last thirty years. Our 
dependent variable is the international reputation of wine denominations. 
We control for a number of potential variables ranging from the general 
characteristics of the group of producers to the quality rules standards set by 
the coalition, from the system of controls to the geographical context in which 
firms operate, to the variables measuring the characteristics of the collective 
brand product. 
The economic literature has associated the introduction of quality 
standards with both negative (entry barrier to new firms) and positive 
(higher average product quality) effects on social welfare, quality and 
reputation. Our findings provide evidence in favor of the positive effects of 
                                                                                                                                                 
even cause death. Between December 1985 and March 1986 several people were intoxicated 
and 23 died. This dramatic event is usually considered the driver of the quality revolution in 
the Italian wine market over the last 25 years: a huge effort had to be made in order to 
recuperate credibility and reputation in both the domestic and foreign markets.   22 
compulsory and voluntary rules on group reputation. Similar results hold for 
the frequency and accuracy of controls.  
In markets with strong asymmetric information, free entry may end up 
being sub-optimal since the relation between number of producers in the 
coalition and group reputation is concave. At the beginning, when the scale of 
production is small, a growing number of members ensure higher visibility, 
but after a peak the collective reputation declines since the incentive to free 
ride prevails.  
Note also that we provide evidence that in efficient markets 
institutional signals are usually overestimated; in fact their impact tend to 
diminish (or even vanish) once one controls for all relevant variables.  
As the dynamics of collective reputation, we show the persistence in 
reputation, which is strongly history dependent. In particular, we provide 
evidence of the presence of a “bad reputation trap”. Moreover,  when it 
changes, collective reputation tends to adjust smoothly, big reputational 
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Table 1 - Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variable Source  Description 
Collective reputation of the coalition   
Collective reputation  HJ's wine book  Number of stars awarded to the denomination, from 1 to 4, while 0 means absence of reputation 
General characteristics of the coalition 
DOCG  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the denomination is a DOCG 
Age   National decrees  Age of the denomination (in years) since it was first awarded a DOC  
Producers Chambers  of 
Commerce 
Number of wineries producing the denomination 
Quality rules set up by the coalition:   
a)  Minimum quality standards (compulsory) 
Compulsory vines  National decrees  Minimum percentage of all compulsory vines (%) 
Grapes yields  National decrees  Maximum quintals of grapes per hectare (q/ha) 
Grapes/wine   National decrees  Maximum conversion ratio: grapes used in wine obtained (%) 
Wine alcoholic content  National decrees  Minimum wine alcoholic content (in %) 
Wine total acidity  National decrees  Minimum total acidity (grams per liter) 
Wine ageing  National decrees  Minimum ageing (number of months) 
b)  Additional voluntary quality standards (vertical differentiation) 
Classico  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is from an historical restricted area within the limits of the denomination 
Sottozona  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine belongs to a defined restricted area of the denomination 
Passito  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is strong, mostly sweet, from grapes dried  
Late harvest  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is a late harvest 
Vin Santo  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is strong and sweet, from “passito” grapes, using traditional methods 
Novello  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is early vintage with carbonic fermentation 
Riserva  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is a selection aged for statutory period, usually in casks or barrels 
System of quality controls   
% producers controlled  Ministry of 
Agriculture/ISTAT 
Percentage of wineries (with respect to the universe of local producers) yearly controlled by the 
local office of the Frauds General Inspection Department of the Ministry of Agriculture (average 
three-year value) 
Amount of penalties  Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Average amount (in €) of penalties yearly given by the local office of the Frauds General Inspection 
Department of the Ministry of Agriculture per number of administrative notification (average 
three-year value) 
Characteristics of the collective brand product: horizontal differentiation controls 
White  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is white 
Rose  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is rosé 
Red  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is red 
Dry  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is dry 
Slightly sweet  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is slightly sweet (i.e., amabile or abboccato) 
Sweet  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is sweet 
Sparkling  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is sparkling (i.e., frizzante) 
Spumante  National decrees  DV equal to 1 if the wine is sparkling and is produced with Charmant-Martinotti or Champenoise 
     (in Italy metodo classico) methods 
Geographical context controls   
GDP per capita  Unioncamere  GDP per capita in the province(s) of production of the denomination 
Entreprises Unioncamere  Enterprises (per 100 inhabitants) in the province(s) of production of the denomination 
Infrastructures Unioncamere  Infrastructures index (Italy=100) in the province(s) of production of the denomination 
Crimes  Unioncamere  Crimes  (per 100,000 inhabitants) in the province(s) of production of the denomination   30 
Value of vineyards  INEA  Value of vineyards (per ha) in the province(s) of production of the denomination 
    
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics of the 2008 Sample 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Collective reputation (number of stars)  1,424  1.03  1.09  0  3.5 
DOCG (DV)  1,424  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Age (years)  1,424  24.10  12.71  1  42 
Producers (number)  1,391  117  369  0  6,592 
Compulsory vines (%)  1,424  82.73  13.61  25  100 
Grapes yields (q. per ha)  1,424  112.54  21.29  40  200 
Grapes/wine (%)  1,424  68.60  5.75  25  75 
Wine alcoholic content (°)  1,424  11.46  1.13  9  18 
Wine total acidity (gr. per l.)  1,424  4.67  0.41  3  6.5 
Wine ageing (months)  1,424  2.32  7.94  0  96 
Classico (DV)  1,424  0.02  0.15  0  1 
Sottozona (DV)  1,424  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Passito (DV)  1,424  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Late harvest (DV)  1,424  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Vin Santo (DV)  1,424  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Novello (DV)  1,424  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Riserva (DV)  1,424  0.31  0.46  0  1 
% producers controlled (%)  1,424  0.01  0.003  0.005  0.02 
Amount of penalties (€)  1,424  351.88  944.77  0.21  3,024.74 
White (DV)  1,424  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Rose (DV)  1,424  0.010  0.099  0  1 
Red (DV)  1,424  0.50  0.50  0  1 
Dry (DV)  1,424  0.94  0.24  0  1 
Slightly sweet (DV)  1,424  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Sweet (DV)  1,424  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Sparkling (DV)  1,424  0.13  0.33  0  1 
Spumante (DV)  1,424  0.14  0.35  0  1 
GDP per capita (€)  1,424  25,099  6,473  9,182  35,619 
Enterprises (per 100 inh.)  1,424  9.38  1.24  6.00  12.00 
Infrastructures (index)  1,424  100  63  24  449 
Crimes (per 100,000 inh.)  1,424  2,931  1,066  1,075  6,546 
Value of vineyards (000 € per ha)  1,424  56.50  43.34  14.00  193.00 
          
Note: (DV) stands for Dummy Variable.   31 
 
Table 3 – Collective Reputation in 2008 
Collective reputation  N. of denominations  %   
0 701  49.2%   
1 52  3.7%   
1.5 169  11.9%   
2 283  19.9%   
2.5 129  9.1%   
3 84  5.9%   
3.5 6  0.4%   
4 0  0   
TOTAL 1,424  100.0%   
Note: HJ also assigns half stars, so that 1.5 (2.5, and 3.5) means between 1 (2, 3) and 2 (3, 4) stars. 
 Table 4 – Static Regressions on Collective Reputation (ordered logit, year 2008) 
Regressors    Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4    Model 5 
    Coef. z    Coef. z    Coef. z    Coef.  z    Coef. z 
                           
DOCG   1.53  5.16*   0.69  2.09**   0.63  1.95***   0.18  0.42    -0.01  -0.01 
Age     0.09  16.38*   0.10  17.64*   0.10  16.96*   0.11  16.90*   0.10  15.24* 
Producers/1000                         1.20 4.01* 
(Producers/1000)  ^2                        -0.17 -2.46** 
Compulsory vines          0.02  4.00*   0.03  4.99*   0.03  5.20*   0.03  4.92* 
Grapes yields          -0.02  -6.52*   -0.02  -5.56*   -0.01  -3.73*   -0.02  -4.20* 
Grapes/wine           -0.06  -2.71*   -0.04 
-
1.86***   -0.03  -1.38   -0.03  -1.21 
Wine alcoholic content          -0.18  -1.36   -0.14 -1.51    -0.10  -1.01   -0.09  -0.89 
Wine total acidity          -1.22  -7.13*   -1.05  -6.15*   -1.07  -6.11*   -1.03  -5.88* 
Wine ageing          0.05  4.47*   0.04  4.15*   0.05  4.52*   0.05  4.50* 
Classico               0.21 0.50    0.42  1.08    0.06  0.14 
Sottozona               0.54  3.09*   0.77  4.34*   0.90  5.01* 
Passito               0.68  1.49    0.81  1.76***   0.90  1.97** 
Late harvest                0.98  2.53**   1.04  2.75*   0.97  2.58** 
Vinsanto               0.96  1.79***   -0.39  -0.68   -0.36  -0.62 
Novello               -0.13  -0.43   0.04  0.14   -0.01  -0.05 
Riserva               0.34  2.41**   0.35  2.54**   .037  2.58** 
% producers controlled (%)                      161.48  7.86*   157.90  7.30* 
Amount of penalties (€)                   0.000002  5.51*   0.000001  5.30* 
Wald test: Prob>Chi2a                            
General characteristics of the coalition   0.0000    0.0000   0.0000   0.0000    0.0000 
Quality rules: MQS (compulsory)        0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Quality rules: Additional voluntary QS (vertical differentiation)           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
System of quality controls                0.0000    0.0000 
Characteristics of the collective brand product     0.0000    0.0291  0.1119   0.0035    0.0006 
Geographical context    0.0000   0.0000  0.0000   0.0108    0.0145 
N. of observations    1,424   1,424   1,424   1,424    1,390 
Pseudo R2     0.17     0.22     0.23     0.26     0.26 
Notes: Ordered Logit regressions with robust standard errors. Coefficients of horizontal differentiation and geographical context controls are omitted for reasons of space. 
a Joint tests for significance of coefficients (Chi-squared Wald tests). 
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Table 5 - Transition Matrix of Collective Reputation from Period “t” to “t+5” 
Reputation   “t+5”   
at time:   0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  TOTAL 
                                 
  0  87.5%  1.2%  3.7%  3.0%  3.0%  0.7%  0.9%  0.0%  0.0%  100.0% 
  0.5  1.4%  54.9%  2.8%  0.0%  9.9%  31.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  100.0% 
  1  5.9%  0.0%  63.6%  9.3%  17.4%  3.6%  0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  100.0% 
  1.5  0.8%  0.0%  2.7%  75.9%  17.8%  2.5%  0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  100.0% 
“t”  2  2.0%  0.1%  2.1%  6.8%  78.5%  8.4%  2.1%  0.0%  0.0%  100.0% 
  2.5  0.0%  0.3%  0.0%  0.6%  20.9%  65.9%  11.7%  0.6%  0.0%  100.0% 
  3  0.3%  0.7%  1.4%  0.0%  4.8%  10.9%  80.3%  1.4%  0.3%  100.0% 
  3.5  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  21.4%  78.6%  0.0%  100.0% 
  4  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  6.3%  0.0%  12.5%  18.8%  62.5%  100.0% 
                                 
                              
 
 
Table 6 - Regressions on Collective Reputation at “t = 0” (1978) and “t = 30” (2008) 
Regressors    t=0 (1978)    t=30 (2008)     
   Coef. z    Coef. z    
               
DOCG         1.58  2.38**    
Age     0.33  8.26*   0.11  17.10*    
Classico   0.16  0.24   -0.39  -0.79     
Sottozona   0.85  3.40*   1.26  4.96*    
Passito   -0.16  -0.27   0.47  0.97    
Late  harvest   0.18  0.31   1.32  3.21*    
Vinsanto   -0.54  -0.74   1.30  2.55**    
Novello         -0.20  -0.61     
Riserva   0.84  3.59*   0.35  1.97**    
               
Wald test: Prob>Chi2a               
General characteristics of the coalition    0.0000    0.0000     
Quality rules: Additional QS (vertical differentiation)    0.0000    0.0000     
Characteristics of the collective brand product    0.0000    0.0005     
Geographical contextb   0.0000    0.0000     
N. of observations    686    1,424     
Pseudo R2     0.31     0.40      
Notes: Logit regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the denomination has a collective reputation 
(presence in the HJ’s wine book), 0 otherwise. Coefficients of horizontal differentiation controls are omitted for reasons of space. 
a Joint tests for significance of coefficients (Chi-squared Wald tests). 
b Geographical controls are regional dummies for regression a t=0, and variables described in Table 1 for estimate at time t=30.  
*  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level;  **  Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level   35
 
Table 7 - Panel Data Regressions on Collective Reputation 
Regressors   1978-2008  1993-2008 
   Coeff.      z  Coeff.  z 
DOCG    0.28 2.02** -0.13  -0.47 
Age     0.12 30.71* 0.17  20.18* 
Producers/1000       0.84  5.81* 
(Producers/1000) ^2       -0.08  -3.18* 
Compulsory vines       0.01  3.88* 
Grapes yields       -0.05  -4.38* 
Grapes/wine         -0.01  -3.00* 
Wine alcoholic content        -0.04  -0.53 
Wine total acidity        -0.50  -10.9* 
Wine ageing        0.06  6.2* 
Classico   0.07  0.44  -0.45  -1.77*** 
Sottozona   0.25  3.28* 0.48  2.14** 
Passito   0.08  0.48 0.99  4.29* 
Late harvest    0.06  0.41  1.10  4.3* 
Vinsanto   1.41  7.33* -0.38  -1.35 
Novello   -0.47  -3.33* -0.04  -0.02 
Riserva   0.38  5.86* 0.45  3.09* 
Wald test: Prob>Chi2a        
General characteristics of the coalition    0.0000    0.0000 
Quality rules: MQS (compulsory)        0.0000 
Quality rules: Additional QS (vertical different.)    0.0000    0.0000 
Characteristics of the collective brand product    0.0000    0.0000 
Geographical context     0.0000  0.0000 
N. of observations    7,014  3,249 
Wald test     0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Random effect ordered probit regressions. Regressions include geographical context (i.e., macro-regional dummies for 1978-2008, and 
variables of Table 1 for 1993-2008) and horizontal differentiation controls, which are omitted for reasons of space. Time dummies are also 
included. 
a Joint tests for significance of coefficients (Chi-squared Wald tests). 
 * Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, *** Significantly different from zero at 
the 0.10 level 
 
 












of the coalition 
Members 







1978 686  Yes  Yes  No  No Yes  No  Yes  No  (RD) 
1983  749 Yes  Yes  No No Yes  No  Yes  No  (RD) 
1988  809 Yes  Yes  No No Yes  No  Yes  No (RD)  
1993 876  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
1998 1,237  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
2003  1,334  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2008  1,424  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Data about reputation is available since 1978, the year of the first issue of the Hugh Johnson’s wine book. Information about age and DOCG status 
is of available for all period under consideration. Compulsory minimum quality standards and the number of producers are available only from 1993 
onwards, while the voluntary additional QS from 1978, as well as horizontal differentiation which is time invariant. Variables on the systems of controls 
are available since 2003. Context variables are available only from 1993, before regional dummies (RD) are used in regressions. 
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Table A.2- Dynamic Panel Data Regressions on Collective Reputation 
Regressors   1993-2008 
   Coeff.      z 
Collective Reputation a “t -1”    0.92 18.05* 
      
DOCG   -0.47  -2.49** 
Age     -0.003  -1.49 
Producers/1000   0.14  1.78*** 
(Producers/1000)^2   -0.01  -1.67*** 
Compulsory vines    -0.001  -0.33 
Grapes yields    -0.05  -2.19** 
Grapes/wine   0.001  0.31 
Wine alcoholic content    -0.09  -1.11 
Wine total acidity    -0.23  -3.22* 
Wine ageing    -0.008  -0.5 
Wald test: Prob>Chi2a      
Quality rules: MQS (compulsory)    0.0214 
N. of observations    2,976 
Wald test     0.0000 
Notes: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond robust regression. Sargan test passed.   
Additional voluntary quality standards and horizontal controls omitted because time independent. 
a Joint tests for significance of coefficients (Chi-squared Wald tests). 
*  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level 
**  Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level 
***  Significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level I 
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